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Abstract The proposed amendments to the EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive pur-
port to improve shareholder rights and powers in investee companies. In general,
these initiatives provide minority shareholders with confidence in corporate gover-
nance and could be useful as a supply-side stimulating measure to encourage investor
interest in pan-European equity markets, therefore contributing to the much-needed
European initiative to develop deep and liquid capital markets in order to provide cor-
porate finance. (For example, the EU Capital Markets Union initiative.) This paper
focuses on the Articles that purport to develop ‘shareholder stewardship’ on the part
of institutional shareholders. The Articles seem to be derived from the UK Steward-
ship Code, which legitimises and encourages active corporate governance roles for
shareholders, therefore boosting their corporate governance rights. However, this pa-
per critically questions that apparent resemblance, and argues that the Articles borrow
the cloak of the stewardship concept to introduce regulatory measures for investment
management practice, and the purpose and function of these Articles may not accord
with the essential ‘corporate governance’ paradigm that Directive is framed in.
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1 Introduction
The proposed amendments to the EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive1 purport to im-
prove shareholder rights and powers in investee companies. In general, these ini-
tiatives provide minority shareholders with confidence in corporate governance and
could be useful as a supply-side stimulating measure to encourage investor interest in
pan-European equity markets, therefore contributing to the much-needed European
initiative to develop deep and liquid capital markets in order to provide corporate
finance. European companies rely excessively on bank-based finance, and slow eco-
nomic recovery in the EU after the global financial crisis is seen to be a result of
the lack of varied avenues of corporate finance, culminating in a funding lacuna if
banks tighten their balance sheets in response to more stringent post-crisis prudential
regulation.2
This paper focuses on the Articles that purport to develop ‘shareholder steward-
ship’ on the part of institutional shareholders. On the face of it, these Articles appear
to be derived from the UK Stewardship Code. Hence, one may be under the impres-
sion that the Articles serve the same purpose of legitimating and encouraging active
behaviour on the part of institutions, therefore according them with more powers in
corporate governance. From the agency theory point of view of the corporation, such
powers for shareholders improve monitoring of the Board and thus benefit sharehold-
ers by checking on divergent interests that directors may pursue. From a resource-
based theory point of view, shareholder activism may even be a useful channel of
strategic and risk management monitoring that provides useful feedback to the Board
for future decision-making.
This paper, however, argues that the resemblance with the UK Stewardship Code is
only apparent. The Directive’s measures have a different tenor from the empowering
language in the Code and tend towards the introduction of obligations for institu-
tions in adopting long-termist and sound investment management practices. We are
of the view that the Articles discussed in this paper introduce regulatory measures
for investment management practice, and the purpose and function of these Articles
may not accord with the essential ‘corporate governance’ paradigm that Directive is
framed in.
1Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC
as regards the encouragement of long long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU
as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement (SWD(2014) 126,127,128 final)
published 9 April 2014; Parliament amended version of 8 July 2015 at http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0257+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, Hereinafter
known as ‘Proposed Shareholders’ Rights Directive’.
2Bank lending has shrunk in the post-crisis years although 2015 sees more recovery in bank lending, see
‘Eurozone Credit Squeeze Ending, But Confidence Shaken by Greece’, The Wall St Journal (29 April
2015) at http://www.wsj.com/articles/eurozone-credit-squeeze-ending-but-confidence-shaken-by-greece-
1430310018, see also ECB Lending Survey of April and July 2015, at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html.
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2 European Shareholders’ Rights Directive—provisions in focus
In April 2014 the European Commission proposed several amendments to the Share-
holders’ Rights Directive including the introduction of an engagement policy for all
institutions and a form of disclosure-based regulation of institutions’ investment poli-
cies and strategies, their arrangements with asset managers, and the accountability of
asset managers to institutions.3
Article 3f of the proposed Shareholder Rights Directive provides that Member
States shall require institutional investors and asset managers to develop an engage-
ment policy, which would state, inter alia, how institutional investors and asset man-
agers intend to integrate shareholder engagement in their investment strategy, mon-
itor their investee companies’ performance,4 exercise their voting rights, use proxy
advisors’ services, and cooperate with other shareholders. Further Article 3f makes it
mandatory that the engagement policy will address issues of management of conflicts
of interest. Institutions are required to publicly disclose the engagement policy, how it
is implemented and the results achieved. If they decide not to institute an engagement
policy or to disclose the matters above, they need to provide a reasoned explanation
for doing so.
Under the proposed Shareholder Rights Directive institutional investors should
also annually disclose to the public their investment strategies and explain how such
strategies are aligned with the duration of their liabilities and with the medium to
long term performance of their assets.5 Additionally, the proposed Directive imposes
disclosure obligations on asset managers, who must disclose on a half-yearly basis to
their institutional clients how their investment strategies and policies intend to meet
their clients’ investment objectives and duration of liabilities,6 and on proxy voting
advisors.7
2.1 Where the similarities lie between the articles in the Shareholder Rights
Directive and the UK Stewardship Code
The requirement in Article 3f which relates to the institution of an engagement policy
on the part of institutional investors and asset managers, is similar to Principle 1 of
the Stewardship Code, that requires UK institutions to develop a stewardship policy.
The Stewardship Code however binds only voluntary signatories while the Directive
is intended for application to all institutions in the EU.
The matters that may be stated in the engagement policy relate to how institutions:
(a) integrate shareholder engagement in their investment strategy;
3Proposed Shareholder Rights Directive, Arts. 3f to 3h.
4Including non-financial aspects and social and environmental risks.
5In particular, if institutions appoint asset managers, institutions must disclose as to how such arrange-
ments would meet their objectives, their policies and strategies in evaluating asset managers and portfolio
turnover, the duration of the appointment and how the agreed performance yardsticks and asset manage-
ment charges and fees accord with their objectives. See Proposed Shareholder Rights Directive, Art. 3g.
6Proposed Shareholder Rights Directive, Art. 3h.
7Proposed Shareholder Rights Directive, Art. 3i.
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(b) monitor investee companies, including on their non-financial performance and
the reduction of social and environmental risks;
(c) conduct dialogues with investee companies;
(d) exercise voting rights;
(e) use services provided by proxy advisors;
(f) cooperate with other shareholders;
(fa) to conduct dialogue and cooperate with other stakeholders of the investee com-
panies.
Other than (e), (fa)8 and some aspects of (b) above, the matters in mandatory engage-
ment policies are consonant with the Principles in the UK Stewardship Code.9 The
Code is very much premised on the acceptance that an active corporate governance
role for institutions will be aligned with their interest in the investment performance
of their portfolio companies.10 Further, (b) is reflected in Principle 3 of the Code that
requires institutions to monitor their investee companies. The acts of ‘monitoring’ are
further developed in the Code, including being adequately informed about their port-
folio companies. In this way, the Code may provide some input into how the Directive
may be interpreted. (c) relates to Principle 4 of the Code which envisages escalation
activities as part of active ownership where necessary, such escalation including hold-
ing dialogues with portfolio companies, such as with the Senior Independent Director
of the Board.
(d) is reflected in Principle 6 of the Code which requires institutions to disclose
their voting policies. One may argue that (d) goes further than its UK counterpart as
it requires the exercise of voting rights to be part of engagement, and not merely the
formulation of a voting policy and its due disclosure as is required under the Code.
Finally, (f) is reflected in the Code’s welcoming stance on collective engagement.
Again, one may make a distinction between the two as (f) refers to co-operation and
this may be wider than that captured in the Code’s collective engagement paradigm.
Collective engagement refers to joint activism by institutions in times of corporate
stress or wider economic stress, and is thus premised upon the protection of collective
economic interests in investment.
Further, Article 3f adopts a comply-or-explain approach i.e. that institutions
should comply with the practice of developing an engagement policy as outlined in
the Article, but if they choose not to they should explain how the lack of an engage-
ment policy would still enable them to achieve their objectives. This is similar to the
Code’s comply-or-explain approach.
8Inserted as amendments by Parliament to the Commission’s original proposal.
9Financial Reporting Council, UK Stewardship Code 2014 at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx.
10Although empirical literature is not so clear on the link between shareholder activism and per-
formance, see Wahal [36]; Karpoff [23], although hedge fund activism and its unique features
may constitute a different paradigm for investigation altogether, see Brav/Jiang/Partnoy/Thomas [6];
Becht/Franks/Grant/Wagner [3].
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2.2 Where the Directive diverges from the UK Stewardship Code
Adopting the signature comply-or-explain approach under the Code, and providing
similar understandings of engagement in the Directive with stewardship under the
Code, the Directive may be regarded as having borrowed from the pioneering efforts
of the Code. This paper argues that the similarity is much more apparent than real. It
is important to look at the substantive differences in order to appreciate the different
nature of the obligations under the Directive and their underlying premises.
First, it is arguable that the proposed Directive demonstrates a normative expec-
tation that shareholder engagement is part and parcel of investment management by
institutions. Although an institution can clearly reject an engagement strategy and
instead explain the irrelevance of shareholder engagement in its policy, the proposed
Shareholder Rights Directive could be regarded as presuming in favour of the op-
timality of shareholder engagement as an investment management practice, and the
onus is on institutions to explain why that is not the case. This approach goes some
way towards hardening shareholder engagement norms although it falls short of im-
posing a ‘duty’ as such to engage. Under Article 3g, there is a duty to publicly dis-
close the implementation and achievement of any engagement on the part of insti-
tutions. Arguably the disclosure-based regulation compels that certain engagement
conduct needs to be carried out in order for there to be sufficient matters to report.
Although an institution can clearly reject an engagement strategy and instead explain
the irrelevance of shareholder engagement in its policy, such an approach is likely to
be regarded as the outlier and not the norm.
Next, Article 3f requires an engagement policy to account for how proxy advisors
are used. The Code does not deal with the issue, as institutions are free to deter-
mine their investment management practices including their use of proxy advisers.
As the paper will explain, the Code’s stance is based very much on treating corpo-
rate governance as a private paradigm of relations between constituents that comprise
the company, and the discharge of investment management practice is not a matter
within the Financial Reporting Council’s purview of corporate governance standards.
The interest in proxy advisers is much more rooted in securities regulation, and in the
UK, it would be the Financial Conduct Authority that may scrutinise this area of de-
velopment. Article 3f reflects the Commission’s interest in investment management,
not only in its relationship to corporate governance, but as a regulable subject as such.
This will be explained further below.
Article 3f was also amended by the European Parliament to shape the engage-
ment policy towards non-financial performance and the reduction of social and en-
vironmental risks, and to compel institutions to engage with stakeholders in their
engagement policies. This would likely reflect a broad-based public interest in mak-
ing shareholders accountable for broader concerns in respect of companies’ oper-
ations and to wider constituents in the exercise of their engagement powers. This
is certainly contrary to the position in the UK. First, the UK regards companies and
their management as being responsible for reporting on stakeholder relations and cor-
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porate responsibility footprints.11 Shareholders are regarded as ‘enlightened’12 and
ought to be interested monitors of such issues, but requiring them to engage on these
issues and treating these issues as being part and parcel of investment management
practice would be a step too far compared to the UK approach. Further, the UK is
still struggling with inhibitions in common law interpretations of the fiduciary duty
for investment fund trustees13 in terms of being able to take on board non-financial
considerations in investment performance.14 UK company law also treats share own-
ership as giving rise to quasi-property rights whose exercise should not be arbitrarily
curtailed,15 and hence the prescription of having to cooperate with stakeholders in
engagement is likely to be regarded as contrary to shareholder rights and freedoms
well-accepted in UK company law.16 It is arguable that the Code, being based on the
company law framework in the UK, is premised on such a private proprietary con-
ception of share ownership, and there is thus no conception of having to engage or
negotiate with stakeholders in the freedom of use of property.
Public disclosure of the exercise of voting rights as required under Article 3f also
seems to indicate the imposition of accountability on institutions beyond their invest-
ment management relationship with their beneficiaries. Further, Article 3g specifies
further public disclosure obligations on the part of institutions, in relation to their in-
vestment strategies, profile and duration of their liabilities and how such contributes
to long-term corporate performance. Key elements of institutions’ arrangements with
their asset managers need to be disclosed. Article 3h also deals with disclosure by as-
set managers to their institutional clients, in order to account for how asset managers
meet their clients’ needs in terms of investment horizon and maturity of liabilities.
The European parliament has suggested amendments to require that a part of asset
managers’ disclosures be made public, with reference to:
(a) how investment decisions are made, in terms of considerations of long term cor-
porate performance and non-financial performance;
(b) explaining the level of portfolio turnover;
(c) the management of actual or potential conflicts of interest in connection with
engagement activities;
(d) the use or otherwise of proxy advisors for the purpose of engagement activities;
and
(e) how their investment strategy and implementation contributes to the medium to
long-term performance of the assets of the institutional investor.
One would have thought that the accountability parameters in investment manage-
ment would revolve around institutions, their asset managers and other delegates, and
11Section 414A, UK Companies Act 2006.
12DTI, Company Law Reform; White Paper (March 2005) at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/
http:/www.dti.gov.uk/cld/WhitePaper.pdf; Keay [24].
13Cowan v Scargill [1985] 1 Ch 270; Harries and Others V. The Church Commissioners for England and
Another [1992] WLR 1241; Thornton [35].
14Watchman/Anstee-Wedderburn/Shipway [37].
15Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1133.
16Ibid.
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their beneficiaries. However, the key tenets of investment management and how they
relate to institutions’ long term liabilities and the impact on long term corporate per-
formance are now regarded to be of interest for public disclosure. The possible public
interest in these issues lies in the fact that the private wealth managed by institutions
and asset managers are actually the long-term social wealth of the working citizenry,
and the financialisation of household and pension savings cannot completely remove
the public interest in these issues into the private contractual sphere. Further, as the
performance of household and pension savings depends very much on the health of
the corporate sector, the sustainability of the financial health of corporate sector also
becomes an issue of public interest and not just of investment performance and num-
bers. This paper argues (see below shortly) that the public interest permeating these
provisions of the proposed Directive is highly important and introduces a different
character to the provisions on shareholder engagement from that embraced under the
UK Code.
Finally, Article 3i imposes a duty on proxy advisory agencies to ‘ensure to the best
of their ability that their research and voting recommendations are accurate and reli-
able, based on a thorough analysis of all the information that is available to them, and
are developed in the sole interest of their clients’. These agencies are further subject
to conduct standards in voluntary codes of conduct where they may be applicable.
This paper suggests that as Article 3i puts emphasis on proxy agencies being able to
ensure the reliability and accuracy of voting recommendations, apart from other stan-
dards of conduct that may be voluntarily applied, the imposition of a distinct legal
duty on proxy advisory agencies seems contemplated. Such a duty could be capable
of enforcement by their institutional or asset manager clients, or as will be suggested
below, more appropriately framed as a regulatory duty accountable to a financial or
securities regulator such as the FCA in the UK.
The potential framing of a duty owed by proxy advisory agencies to ensure re-
liable and accurate voting recommendations poses a number of challenges. This is
because voting recommendations are likely to be regarded as ‘opinions’, and such
are not normally actionable under the law of misrepresentation,17 although there is
case law to suggest that an opinion that is not honestly held can amount to a mis-
representation.18 The standard introduced in Article 3i seems to indicate that proxy
agencies may be liable for negligence, as proxy advisory agencies are asked to en-
sure ‘to the best of their ability’ that their voting recommendations are reliable and
accurate. The adequacy of being informed is likely to form the cornerstone of such
negligence liability.
It is questioned, however, why Article 3i should introduce negligence liability for
proxy advisory agencies? Would not the general law in negligence deal with this
issue, as proxy advisers likely owe a duty of care to the asset managers and their
17Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177; Ball v Banner [2000] EGCS 36, where property advisers’ opinions
as to the profitability of certain lettings are not held to be actionable misrepresentations.
18Smith v Land and House Property Corporation (1884) LR 28 Ch D 7; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon
[1976] QB 801.
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institutional clients?19 Further, in this age of information abundance, what extent of
research is needed on the part of proxy advisory agencies in order to discharge the
standard of ‘best of their ability’?
As will be discussed below, there is also the possibility that the duty framed in
Article 3i is a regulatory duty, and hence introduces accountability to the securities
regulator who can scrutinise whether the standard of ‘to the best of their ability’ is
discharged. In such case the development of the regulatory standard may create a
bifurcation from the general law of negligence, which is not inconceivable, given
that the UK financial regulators have already introduced a separate conduct regime
for many financial sector individuals apart from their general obligations in contract,
trust, tort or company law.20 That said, it may be regarded as objectionable to impose
a regulatory duty requiring accurate and reliable recommendations to be provided, as
such a duty may easily be susceptible to enforcement with the benefit of hindsight.
It is instructive to note that in the EU’s regulation of credit rating agencies,21 credit
rating agencies are not subject to a duty to ensure that their ratings are accurate or reli-
able as such, they are made subject to procedural duties that function as proxy signals
to the quality of their credit ratings, such as having sound organisational and inter-
nal control arrangements, robust management of conflicts of interest, and compliance
with certain standards of methodology prescribed in regulation.22 Further, credit rat-
ing agencies may be subject to civil enforcement for gross breach of regulatory duties
causing loss, and not for ‘inaccurate ratings’ per se.23
Article 3i also requires proxy advisory agencies to make public disclosure of the
following:
(a) the essential features of the methodologies and models they apply;
(b) the main information sources they use;
(c) whether and, if so, how they take national market, legal, regulatory and company-
specific conditions into account;
(d) the essential features of the research undertaken and voting policies applied for
each market;
(e) whether and to what extent they have communication or dialogues with compa-
nies and their stakeholders,
(f) the policy regarding prevention and management of potential conflicts of interest;
(g) the total number and the qualifications of staff involved in the preparation of the
voting recommendations;
(h) the total number of voting recommendations provided in the last year.
The requirements of public disclosure enable scrutiny into what proxy advisers have
undertaken, ‘to the best of their ability’, in providing accurate and reliable voting
19The proximity required under a general duty of care in the law of negligence would likely be satisfied
in the rather ascertainable scope of asset managers and institutions affected by proxy advisors’ voting
recommendations. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2.
20Approved Persons Regime or APER, in the FCA Handbook. See also Chiu [10].
21Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009
on credit rating agencies.
22See Chiu [11]; Alcubilla/del Pozo [1]; Langohr/Langohr [27].
23Haar [22].
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recommendations. These support the suspicion raised in this paper that the duty in
Article 3i could be framed as a regulatory duty, reflecting the public interest in the
influence of proxy advisory agencies over institutions and asset managers who hold
much financialised social wealth in their hands.
The examination of Articles 3f to 3i seems to show more divergence from the UK
Stewardship Code than convergence or a natural ideological extension of the Code.
This paper argues that the Articles are rooted in different objectives, and/or present
ideological contradistinctions with what underlies the Stewardship Code.
3 From corporate governance to financial/securities regulation
The Commission explains24 that improving shareholder engagement is likely to ad-
dress the issue of excessive short termism on the part of the asset management indus-
try in managing institutional funds. In the Commission’s view, short termism is not
conducive for meaningful monitoring of corporate behaviour. Shareholders’ short-
term demand for financial performance puts pressure on companies, compromising
their long-term wealth creation potential. Further, short termism on the part of asset
managers adversely affects ultimate returns for institutional beneficiaries. The Com-
mission’s concerns are rooted in public interest concerns regarding the viability of
pension savings through investment. Hence, subjecting institutional investment man-
agement to standards and scrutiny is arguably a form of re-regulation, in order to
ensure that the privatised and financialised form of social welfare provision may de-
liver public interest objectives in due course.25 In this regard, the gradual hardening
of shareholder engagement norms serves the public interest purpose, and is a form
regulation of investment management practices, although such norms are expressed
as corporate governance standards.26
It may be counter-argued that as the proposed Shareholder Rights Directive is
currently drafted, the Commission stays away from imposing an obligation on in-
stitutions to engage, and, hence, institutions remain free to determine the nature of
engagement that works best for them. If this is the case, engagement as such, re-
mains in the realm of soft law and the duty to develop an engagement policy may be
regarded as a meta-regulatory measure,27 where regulation sets out broad principles,
the detailed implementation of which is left very much to the firm’s discretion. It may
be argued that such an approach is consistent with treating shareholder engagement as
a choice in institutions’ corporate governance roles, and is therefore not as prescribed
as imagined above. However, as discussed above, there are assumed benchmarks of
optimal behaviour in the Directive ie to engage, and much prescription that surrounds
the nature of engagement and public disclosure. Hence, the provisions do not seem
to be merely enabling or facilitative for shareholders to enhance their corporate gov-
ernance positions. Rather, they seem to be more prescriptive as to how shareholders’
24Proposed Shareholder Rights Directive, at pp. 4, 5, 7 and 8.
25Broadbent/Palumbo/Woodman [7]; Polillo [33]; Erturk/Froud/Johal/Leaver/Williams [20].
26Policy underlying the Financial Services Action Plan 1999, Financial Services: Implementing the
Framework for Financial Markets-Action Plan (1998) COM (1999) 232.
27Coglianese/Mendelson [16]; Parker [30, 31]; Scott [34].
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corporate governance positions should be framed in order to meet public interest ob-
jectives. The reference to engagement policies including stakeholder concerns, the
reduction of social and environmental risks and cooperation with stakeholders re-
flect such position. This is a different approach from the UK Code which sees its
engagement template as one that enhances shareholders’ corporate governance posi-
tions in the agency-based paradigm of corporate law, if institutions choose to adopt
it. Further, the provision on proxy advisers appears to be highly regulative in nature
although it seems prima facie to give rise to civil obligations to their institutional and
asset manager clients.
In sum, the position adopted by the Commission’s proposed Directive contains
many regulative and prescriptive elements within a wrapper of a comply-or-explain
approach for institutions as regards shareholder engagement. This approach is inher-
ently contradictory, especially given the expansion of the regulative aspects that Par-
liament has now introduced in the amended text. Regulating investment management
intermediaries overtly is not out of step with the tenor of modern financial regulation.
The buy-side in finance is disproportionately less regulated than the sell-side, and
both sides give rise to issues of public concern such as financial stability and sus-
tainability.28 There is increasing recognition that regulatory standards applied to both
buy and sell-sides may need evening out from a functional perspective of the risks
they generate. A possible explanation could be that the proposed Directive is under
the purview of the Directorate for Justice and Consumers and not under the Inter-
nal Market Directorate which deals with financial regulation. Further, as regulatory
scrutiny over the buy-side is only emerging at the international level,29 perhaps the
Commission does not wish to engage in overt regulatory initiatives until international
wisdom has matured in this area. The tentative nature of Articles 3f to 3i has made
these provisions ambiguous in terms of their place in the intersection between the
private agency-based paradigm in corporate governance and the more public interest-
oriented securities and financial regulation.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the Shareholders’ Rights Directive rightly
deals with the ‘publicisation’ of corporate governance as the European perspective of
corporate governance should not be confined to an Anglo-American one that empha-
sises the private and closed nature of corporate governance and intra-accountability.30
Such a perspective has arguably, artificially and unfairly shut stakeholders31 and the
wider community out of discourse as to the normative objectives and accountabil-
28The buy-side in finance has consistently resisted regulation, for example, see the debates surrounding
whether large asset managers should be subject to increased regulation in light of prudential concerns,
FSB, FSB and IOSCO propose Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-Insurer Global
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (4 March 2015), and the recent retreat of regulatory fervour
in the wake of lobbying by asset managers, see ‘Plans to label big fund managers ‘systemic’ in jeopardy’,
Financial Times (17 June 2015); ‘Fund Managers to escape systemic label’, Financial Times (14 July
2015).
29For example, FSB and Iosco, FSB and IOSCO publish Public Responses to the Second Consultative Doc-
ument on NBNI G-SIFI Assessment Methodologies (12 June 2015) at http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/2015/06/fsb-and-iosco-publish-public-responses-to-the-second-consultative-document-on-nbni-g-sifi-
assessment-methodologies/.
30Easterbrook/Fischel [18]; Cheffins [9].
31Blair [5]; Blair/Stout [4]; Mayer [29]; Freeman [21].
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ity of the modern corporation.32 Hence, the Directive’s approach to frame clearly
shareholders’ obligations and to introduce avenues of public accountability for them
serves as an articulation of social expectations of institutional shareholder conduct.
However, this view of the corporation may not be universally shared in Europe.33 This
raises the question whether the harmonisation of such prescriptions for institutional
shareholder conduct should be better carried out under the premises of securities or
financial regulation, which will then open the way for securities regulators to sub-
ject investment management practices to scrutiny and enforcement by the relevant
securities or financial regulator.
3.1 Compatibility with UK corporate governance frameworks?
Within the confines of this paper, the ideological debates relating to the corporate
objective and corporate governance will not be canvassed, but this paper points out
the conflict and contradistinctions that the ‘publicisation’ of corporate law will pose
for UK corporate governance. In the UK, regulatory aspects of corporate governance
have been introduced largely for the following reasons:
(a) mandatory rules necessary for ensuring a fair balance of power among the differ-
ent constituents, such protecting minority shareholders and creditors;
(b) rules adopted by listing regimes in order to converge with reputable international
standards or make the UK markets more attractive to both issuers and investors;
and
(c) where transposition of European rules are required.
Company law provides for a regime of division of powers between shareholders and
the Board so that certain exercises of power by the Board may be checked by the
general meeting.34 Minority shareholders are especially protected via the litigation
options of the derivative action35 and/or unfair prejudice petition,36 and where listed
companies are concerned, they are further protected by the best practices of corpo-
rate governance37 adopted by the London Stock Exchange and the enhanced listing
regime38 introduced by the FCA to protect minority shareholders in block-holder
controlled listed companies. Law and soft law have taken steps to the extent nec-
essary to empower weaker groups in corporate governance where such weaknesses
may be entrenched and exploited. They are targeted towards ‘market failures’ within
the internal paradigm of the company, and aim to be as proportionate as possible in
32Mayer [29]; Keay [25]; Parkinson [32].
33For example, see Wymmersch [38]; Davies/Hopt [17].
34See for example, Part 10, chapter 4 of the UK Companies Act 2006, Arts. 3 and 4 of the Model Articles
for Private and Public Companies Limited by Shares.
35S260–263, UK Companies Act 2006.
36S994, UK Companies Act 2006.
37UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate
-governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx.
38Listing Rules 6.1A, FCA Handbook, see discussion in Chiu/Barker [15].
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order not to disrupt the freedom of decision-making and organisation in the company,
which is a private legal person.39
The soft law of corporate governance40 and stewardship41 are also purposed to-
wards enhancing the attractiveness of London markets for issuers and investors in the
global competition for listings and investments.42 They are seen as market-building
measures reflecting the desires of the international investment community, introduc-
ing standardised best practices for Board composition and behaviour and the practices
of shareholder engagement with their investee companies.
The UK’s tendency to regulate corporate governance dynamics is very much
bound up with a market-based view of the corporation—as an investible asset on
the platform of internationally competitive securities markets, and as an engine of
wealth creation driven largely by its capital providers and managers. Even reforms
introduced in recent years relating to non-financial transparency43 and the obliga-
tion for directors to take into account stakeholders’ concerns in long-term decision
making44 revolve around changing market-based perspectives of the importance of
‘environmental, social and governance’ (ESG) concerns for the financial bottom-line
of companies.45 The key market-based perspective of the corporation held in the UK,
supported by company law and corporate governance frameworks that adopt a private
paradigmatic approach, are at odds with the ‘publicisation’ of the corporation where
corporate governance actors such as shareholders may need to conform to social ex-
pectations of their conduct, and where the characterisation of their rights may be less
‘proprietary’ in nature.
4 Conclusion
In the area of company law which is not subject to maximum harmonisation in the
EU, it is queried to what extent Articles 3f to 3i of the proposed Shareholders’ Rights
Directive may sharpen the underlying ideological contests between the UK and the
EU or among Member States of different leaning. In this light, we advocate that
the public interest in investment management practices should be more sharply and
overtly articulated as a basis for regulatory measures as part of securities and financial
regulation. Hence, Articles 3f to 3i can then be properly reframed and debated as to
whether a form of maximum harmonisation is required in the regulation of investment
management practices in the EU. Such an approach can also pave the way for more
thorough policy thinking in the realm of regulating investment management in its in-
termediation chains, including institutions, asset managers, proxy advisory agencies
and other players in the chain. Upon these premises, the regulation or regulability of
39Armour/Whincop [2].
40UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, above.
41UK Stewardship Code 2014, above.
42La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer [26].
43Such as the reforms to UK Companies Act 2006, s414A. See Chiu [12].
44S172, UK Companies Act 2006, see discussion in Laughrey/Keay/Cerioni [28].
45Chiu [13, 14]; Brown/Fraser [8].
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investment management practices including institutions’ corporate governance role,
can be more clearly and widely considered in the context of societal expectations and
regulatory policy.
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